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This special issue contains seven papers on The Emergence and Stability of 
Institutions. Recently, this topic has drawn attention from different domains of 
economic analysis, some so far away from each other as, for example, game 
theory and economic history. The papers collected here reflect this variety. They 
can, however, be regarded as a (Wittgensteinian) family: each paper is related to 
several other papers. Although there is not one theme (apart from the broad topic 
of this issue) that is developed in all papers, there are four themes that are dealt 
with in one way or another in the collection as a whole: (i) coordination problems, 
(ii) emergence, (iii) learning and belief change, (iv) persistence. Subsets of papers 
can be grouped around these themes. 
Coordination problems within firms with work norms as their solution are 
studied at a micro level by Goyal and Janssen. Two papers deal with coordination 
at a social level. (a) The problem of how to coordinate exchange with money as its 
solution is the focus of analysis by Van Ees and Garretsen; (b) Sugden analyses 
the problem of coordination in societies with social conventions as their solution. 
At an intermediate level, the problem of coordination among firms in a market, or 
between different markets, with the solution of specific institutional arrangements 
is analyzed in Menard, Bianchi and De Marchi. 
The issue of emergence is analyzed as a consequence of existing tensions of 
one sort or the other. De Marchi shows that tension between different market 
forms creates new market forms. OrlCan demonstrates how a public opinion 
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emerges in a world where different opinions compete. Sugden studies conditions 
under which a convention emerges in social situations where multiple conventions 
compete. Finally, Bianchi (and to some extent MCnard) shows how, among other 
things, new market forms emerge when firms compete 
With respect to the issue of learning and belief change two approaches can be 
discerned. A first approach, exemplified by Goyai and Janssen, and Orlean, 
focuses on the question whether, and if so how, individuals learn or change 
beliefs. Their results point at possible inefficiencies (in terms of pay-offs or loss of 
information) even if individuals are rational. The second approach, exemplified by 
the papers by Bianchi, and Van Ees and Garretsen, emphasize more the institu- 
tional environment in which firms and markets operate. This second approach 
stresses the importance of trial-and-error and historical contingencies for an 
understanding of the emergence of actual institutional arrangements or conven- 
tions (money). 
Finally, the issue of persistence is also analyzed from two distinct points of 
view. Sugden, Orlean, and Goyal and Janssen analyze the persistence question in 
terms of the incentives individual actors have to conform (not to induce change). 
This is exemplified by the analysis of Goyal and Janssen who show that the lack 
of incentives of a worker in an organization to reveal useful information might 
lead certain conventions to persist. De Marchi, and Van Ees and Garretsen, on the 
other hand, investigate the issue of persistence more in terms of the institutional 
and historical conditions that are necessary for persistence. The importance that 
Van Ees and Garretsen attach to the formal institution of a Central Bank in 
providing trust that is necessary to give money its general acceptability is 
illustrative in this respect. 
Of course, each paper contributes to its own domain of analysis. Part of the 
novelty of the papers lies, however, in the fact that they approach the issues they 
address from the point of view of the common theme of this special issue. This is 
what creates the family relation between these papers on The Emergence and 
Stability of Institutions. A few remarks on the content of the individual papers will 
conclude this introduction. 
The paper by Menard argues that the basic terms of the New Institutional 
Economics research program, namely markets, organizations and institutions, are 
not clearly defined. He makes an attempt at conceptual clarification, extending the 
distinction between institutional environment and institutional arrangements. He 
also emphasizes the role of hybrid forms as well as the necessity to maintain a 
discrete conceptual structure. In her paper, Bianchi develops the idea of the 
interaction between markets and organizations (firms) further. She points out that 
firms and markets create and recreate each other in a never ending flux. Key terms 
in her paper are the creation of capabilities, learning and innovation. She contrasts 
her approach with a transaction cost approach. De Marchi’s paper on the history of 
the art market in 17th century Holland is in some important ways closely linked to 
Bianchi’s analysis. He argues that the tension between two forms of institutional 
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arrangements, namely two forms of markets, creates new arrangements. This 
argument is supported by a detailed study of the historical development of 
different selling practices in two cities, Amsterdam and Haarlem. 
The papers by Goyal and Janssen, and Sugden provide a game theoretic 
approach to some issues concerning the stability of conventions. Goyal and 
Janssen study the role conventions (work norms) play in firms to solve some 
coordination problems. They show that there is a tendency for such conventions to 
persist even when they support inefficient outcomes. As a means of investigating 
the (in) stability of social conventions, Sugden inquires into the conditions under 
which different social conventions can coexist together. He employs evolutionary 
game theoretic techniques to argue that coexistence is indeed a possible stable 
situation if each of these conventions is used in a different domain of social 
interactions. 
The papers by Orlean, and Van Ees and Garretsen look at conventions in 
financial markets and conventional aspects of the use of money, respectively. 
Orlean underlines the importance of the commonality of expectations in defining 
conventions. He goes on studying how this commonality of expectations emerges 
and whether it is stable in a general model that probably best represents financial 
markets. Van Ees and Garretsen argue that one of the most important features of 
money is that it facilitates coordination of economic activities. Their aim is to 
investigate the implications for monetary theory of the idea that the general 
acceptability of money is a convention. They show that money is essentially 
rooted in history and that it is not accidental that it has emerged together with 
formal institutions like Central Banks, They contrast their ideas with approaches to 
monetary theory that are based on general equilibrium or game theory. 
The variety of the set of papers and of the methodologies involved reflects the 
diversity of approaches that can be used to study the emergence and stability of 
institutions. In our view, this diversity is a clear indication of how crucial the 
questions are, and how lively the associated research. 
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